Sign requests
Last reviewed: over 1 year ago
Verify a signed request using the HMAC and SHA-256 algorithms or return a 403.
You can both verify and generate signed requests from within a Worker using the Web Crypto APIs ↗.
The following Worker will:
-
For request URLs beginning with
/generate/
, replace/generate/
with/
, sign the resulting path with its timestamp, and return the full, signed URL in the response body. -
For all other request URLs, verify the signed URL and allow the request through.
import { Buffer } from "node:buffer";
const encoder = new TextEncoder();
// How long an HMAC token should be valid for, in secondsconst EXPIRY = 60;
export default { /** * * @param {Request} request * @param {{SECRET_DATA: string}} env * @returns */ async fetch(request, env) { // You will need some secret data to use as a symmetric key. This should be // attached to your Worker as an encrypted secret. // Refer to https://developers.cloudflare.com/workers/configuration/secrets/ const secretKeyData = encoder.encode( env.SECRET_DATA ?? "my secret symmetric key", );
// Import your secret as a CryptoKey for both 'sign' and 'verify' operations const key = await crypto.subtle.importKey( "raw", secretKeyData, { name: "HMAC", hash: "SHA-256" }, false, ["sign", "verify"], );
const url = new URL(request.url);
// This is a demonstration Worker that allows unauthenticated access to /generate // In a real application you would want to make sure that // users could only generate signed URLs when authenticated if (url.pathname.startsWith("/generate/")) { url.pathname = url.pathname.replace("/generate/", "/");
const timestamp = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
// This contains all the data about the request that you want to be able to verify // Here we only sign the timestamp and the pathname, but often you will want to // include more data (for instance, the URL hostname or query parameters) const dataToAuthenticate = `${url.pathname}${timestamp}`;
const mac = await crypto.subtle.sign( "HMAC", key, encoder.encode(dataToAuthenticate), );
// Refer to https://developers.cloudflare.com/workers/runtime-apis/nodejs/ // for more details on using Node.js APIs in Workers const base64Mac = Buffer.from(mac).toString("base64");
url.searchParams.set("verify", `${timestamp}-${base64Mac}`);
return new Response(`${url.pathname}${url.search}`); // Verify all non /generate requests } else { // Make sure you have the minimum necessary query parameters. if (!url.searchParams.has("verify")) { return new Response("Missing query parameter", { status: 403 }); }
const [timestamp, hmac] = url.searchParams.get("verify").split("-");
const assertedTimestamp = Number(timestamp);
const dataToAuthenticate = `${url.pathname}${assertedTimestamp}`;
const receivedMac = Buffer.from(hmac, "base64");
// Use crypto.subtle.verify() to guard against timing attacks. Since HMACs use // symmetric keys, you could implement this by calling crypto.subtle.sign() and // then doing a string comparison -- this is insecure, as string comparisons // bail out on the first mismatch, which leaks information to potential // attackers. const verified = await crypto.subtle.verify( "HMAC", key, receivedMac, encoder.encode(dataToAuthenticate), );
if (!verified) { return new Response("Invalid MAC", { status: 403 }); }
// Signed requests expire after one minute. Note that this value should depend on your specific use case if (Date.now() / 1000 > assertedTimestamp + EXPIRY) { return new Response( `URL expired at ${new Date((assertedTimestamp + EXPIRY) * 1000)}`, { status: 403 }, ); } }
return fetch(new URL(url.pathname, "https://example.com"), request); },};
import { Buffer } from "node:buffer";
const encoder = new TextEncoder();
// How long an HMAC token should be valid for, in secondsconst EXPIRY = 60;
interface Env { SECRET_DATA: string;}export default { async fetch(request, env): Promise<Response> { // You will need some secret data to use as a symmetric key. This should be // attached to your Worker as an encrypted secret. // Refer to https://developers.cloudflare.com/workers/configuration/secrets/ const secretKeyData = encoder.encode( env.SECRET_DATA ?? "my secret symmetric key", );
// Import your secret as a CryptoKey for both 'sign' and 'verify' operations const key = await crypto.subtle.importKey( "raw", secretKeyData, { name: "HMAC", hash: "SHA-256" }, false, ["sign", "verify"], );
const url = new URL(request.url);
// This is a demonstration Worker that allows unauthenticated access to /generate // In a real application you would want to make sure that // users could only generate signed URLs when authenticated if (url.pathname.startsWith("/generate/")) { url.pathname = url.pathname.replace("/generate/", "/");
const timestamp = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
// This contains all the data about the request that you want to be able to verify // Here we only sign the timestamp and the pathname, but often you will want to // include more data (for instance, the URL hostname or query parameters) const dataToAuthenticate = `${url.pathname}${timestamp}`;
const mac = await crypto.subtle.sign( "HMAC", key, encoder.encode(dataToAuthenticate), );
// Refer to https://developers.cloudflare.com/workers/runtime-apis/nodejs/ // for more details on using NodeJS APIs in Workers const base64Mac = Buffer.from(mac).toString("base64");
url.searchParams.set("verify", `${timestamp}-${base64Mac}`);
return new Response(`${url.pathname}${url.search}`); // Verify all non /generate requests } else { // Make sure you have the minimum necessary query parameters. if (!url.searchParams.has("verify")) { return new Response("Missing query parameter", { status: 403 }); }
const [timestamp, hmac] = url.searchParams.get("verify").split("-");
const assertedTimestamp = Number(timestamp);
const dataToAuthenticate = `${url.pathname}${assertedTimestamp}`;
const receivedMac = Buffer.from(hmac, "base64");
// Use crypto.subtle.verify() to guard against timing attacks. Since HMACs use // symmetric keys, you could implement this by calling crypto.subtle.sign() and // then doing a string comparison -- this is insecure, as string comparisons // bail out on the first mismatch, which leaks information to potential // attackers. const verified = await crypto.subtle.verify( "HMAC", key, receivedMac, encoder.encode(dataToAuthenticate), );
if (!verified) { return new Response("Invalid MAC", { status: 403 }); }
// Signed requests expire after one minute. Note that this value should depend on your specific use case if (Date.now() / 1000 > assertedTimestamp + EXPIRY) { return new Response( `URL expired at ${new Date((assertedTimestamp + EXPIRY) * 1000)}`, { status: 403 }, ); } }
return fetch(new URL(url.pathname, "https://example.com"), request); },} satisfies ExportedHandler<Env>;
import { Buffer } from "node:buffer";import { Hono } from "hono";import { proxy } from "hono/proxy";
const encoder = new TextEncoder();
// How long an HMAC token should be valid for, in secondsconst EXPIRY = 60;
interface Env { SECRET_DATA: string;}
const app = new Hono();
// Handle URL generation requestsapp.get("/generate/*", async (c) => { const env = c.env;
// You will need some secret data to use as a symmetric key const secretKeyData = encoder.encode( env.SECRET_DATA ?? "my secret symmetric key", );
// Import the secret as a CryptoKey for both 'sign' and 'verify' operations const key = await crypto.subtle.importKey( "raw", secretKeyData, { name: "HMAC", hash: "SHA-256" }, false, ["sign", "verify"], );
// Replace "/generate/" prefix with "/" let pathname = c.req.path.replace("/generate/", "/");
const timestamp = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
// Data to authenticate: pathname + timestamp const dataToAuthenticate = `${pathname}${timestamp}`;
// Sign the data const mac = await crypto.subtle.sign( "HMAC", key, encoder.encode(dataToAuthenticate), );
// Convert the signature to base64 const base64Mac = Buffer.from(mac).toString("base64");
// Add verification parameter to URL url.searchParams.set("verify", `${timestamp}-${base64Mac}`);
return c.text(`${pathname}${url.search}`);});
// Handle verification for all other requestsapp.all("*", async (c) => { const env = c.env; const url = c.req.url;
// You will need some secret data to use as a symmetric key const secretKeyData = encoder.encode( env.SECRET_DATA ?? "my secret symmetric key", );
// Import the secret as a CryptoKey for both 'sign' and 'verify' operations const key = await crypto.subtle.importKey( "raw", secretKeyData, { name: "HMAC", hash: "SHA-256" }, false, ["sign", "verify"], );
// Make sure the request has the verification parameter if (!c.req.query("verify")) { return c.text("Missing query parameter", 403); }
// Extract timestamp and signature const [timestamp, hmac] = c.req.query("verify")!.split("-"); const assertedTimestamp = Number(timestamp);
// Recreate the data that should have been signed const dataToAuthenticate = `${c.req.path}${assertedTimestamp}`;
// Convert base64 signature back to ArrayBuffer const receivedMac = Buffer.from(hmac, "base64");
// Verify the signature const verified = await crypto.subtle.verify( "HMAC", key, receivedMac, encoder.encode(dataToAuthenticate), );
// If verification fails, return 403 if (!verified) { return c.text("Invalid MAC", 403); }
// Check if the signature has expired if (Date.now() / 1000 > assertedTimestamp + EXPIRY) { return c.text( `URL expired at ${new Date((assertedTimestamp + EXPIRY) * 1000)}`, 403, ); }
// If verification passes, proxy the request to example.com return proxy(`https://example.com/${c.req.path}`, ...c.req);});
export default app;
from pyodide.ffi import to_js as _to_jsfrom js import Response, URL, TextEncoder, Buffer, fetch, Object, crypto
def to_js(x): return _to_js(x, dict_converter=Object.fromEntries)
encoder = TextEncoder.new()
# How long an HMAC token should be valid for, in secondsEXPIRY = 60
async def on_fetch(request, env): # Get the secret key secret_key_data = encoder.encode(env.SECRET_DATA if hasattr(env, "SECRET_DATA") else "my secret symmetric key")
# Import the secret as a CryptoKey for both 'sign' and 'verify' operations key = await crypto.subtle.importKey( "raw", secret_key_data, to_js({"name": "HMAC", "hash": "SHA-256"}), False, ["sign", "verify"] )
url = URL.new(request.url)
if url.pathname.startswith("/generate/"): url.pathname = url.pathname.replace("/generate/", "/", 1)
timestamp = int(Date.now() / 1000)
# Data to authenticate data_to_authenticate = f"{url.pathname}{timestamp}"
# Sign the data mac = await crypto.subtle.sign( "HMAC", key, encoder.encode(data_to_authenticate) )
# Convert to base64 base64_mac = Buffer.from(mac).toString("base64")
# Set the verification parameter url.searchParams.set("verify", f"{timestamp}-{base64_mac}")
return Response.new(f"{url.pathname}{url.search}") else: # Verify the request if not "verify" in url.searchParams: return Response.new("Missing query parameter", status=403)
verify_param = url.searchParams.get("verify") timestamp, hmac = verify_param.split("-")
asserted_timestamp = int(timestamp)
data_to_authenticate = f"{url.pathname}{asserted_timestamp}"
received_mac = Buffer.from(hmac, "base64")
# Verify the signature verified = await crypto.subtle.verify( "HMAC", key, received_mac, encoder.encode(data_to_authenticate) )
if not verified: return Response.new("Invalid MAC", status=403)
# Check expiration if Date.now() / 1000 > asserted_timestamp + EXPIRY: expiry_date = Date.new((asserted_timestamp + EXPIRY) * 1000) return Response.new(f"URL expired at {expiry_date}", status=403)
# Proxy to example.com if verification passes return fetch(URL.new(f"https://example.com{url.pathname}"), request)
The provided example code for signing requests is compatible with the is_timed_hmac_valid_v0()
Rules language function. This means that you can verify requests signed by the Worker script using a WAF custom rule.
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